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Abstract 
The process industry has always been faced with the challenging task of determining the overall 
unavailability of safeguarding systems such as the Safety Instrumented Systems (SISs). This 
paper proposes an unavailability model for a redundant SIS using Markov chains. The proposed 
model incorporates process demands in conjunction with dangerous detected and undetected 
failures for the first time and evaluates their impacts on the unavailability quantification of SIS. 
The unavailability of the safety instrumented system is quantified by considering the Probability 
of Failure on Demand (PFD) for low demand systems. The safety performance of the system is 
also assessed using Hazardous Event Frequency (HEF) to measure the frequency of system 
entering a hazardous state that will lead to an accident. The accuracy of the proposed Markov 
model is verified for a case study of a chemical reactor protection system. It is demonstrated that 
the proposed approach provides a sufficiently robust result for all demand rates, demand 
durations, dangerous detected and undetected failure rates and associated repair rates for safety 
instrumented systems utilised in low demand mode of operation. The effectiveness of the 
proposed model offers a robust opportunity to conduct unavailability assessment of redundant 
SISs subject to process demands. 
Keywords: Markov Chain; Unavailability Assessment, Safety Instrumented Systems; Hazardous 
Event Frequency; Process Demand. 
1.0 Introduction 
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) are predominantly used to prevent hazardous events, and to 
mitigate their consequences to humans, the environment, and financial assets. IPLs can be 
implemented by physical barriers such as mechanical systems, instrumented protective functions 
or in the form of administrative procedures. An Electric, Electronic and Programmable 
Electronic System (E/E/PES) such as a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is an independent layer 
of protection that provides a protective function by detecting hazardous events, performing the 
required safety action and maintaining the safe status of the system. The unavailability of a SIS is 
usually realised from overall hazard and risk analyses. Without suitable design, implementation 
and maintenance, the SIS may fail to provide the necessary risk reduction. In this context, IEC 
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61508 [1] standard is a guide for designing, validating and verifying the safety function realised 
by an E/E/PES throughout all phases of its lifecycle. The principles introduced in this generic 
standard, are also customised in application specific standards, such as IEC 61511 [2] for the 
process industry, IEC 62425 [3] for the railway industry, and ISO/DIS 26262 [4] for the 
automobile industry. 
 
In accordance with IEC 61508 [1] the performance of a SIS shall be proven using a suitable 
technique. Although no particular model is recommended by the international standards, some of 
the options are cited in their appendices. The most commonly used techniques include Simplified 
Equation (SE) [1,5], Bayesian methods [6] Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) [7,8], Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) [9,10], Markov Analysis (MA) [11–13] and Petri Nets (PN) [14]; all of which 
can be used to analyse the reliability of SIS utilised in various modes of operations. These 
diverse techniques have their own advantages and limitations. Zhang et al. [15] demonstrated that 
the simplified equations given in the standard are over simplistic and are more suitable for 
practicing engineers. The reliability block diagrams represent a success oriented logic system 
structure and hence the analyst will focus on functions rather than failures, and may thereby fail 
to identify all the possible failure modes [16]. The fault tree analysis is straightforward to handle 
for the practitioners and generates approximations which sometimes provide non-conservative 
results as argued by Dutuit et al. [14]. 
 
Whilst the main benefit of Markov models is accuracy and flexibility according to the specific 
feature of each mode, establishing a Markov model of k out of n (koon) with a high value of n, 
can be time consuming and error prone [17–19]. Signoret et al. [20] employed Petri Nets to 
categorise safety instrumented systems. Although Petri Nets allow assessment of the SIS 
performance very finely taking into account several parameters, the models of safety 
instrumented system produced by Petri Nets can be challenging to use and the analyst should 
make substantial effort to obtain an understandable model to compute unavailability [20]. 
 
A comparison of reliability analysis techniques carried out by Rouvroye and Brombacher [21] 
concludes that Markov analysis covers most aspects for quantitative safety evaluation. 
Additionally, Innal [22] investigated the performance of different modelling approaches and 
observed that Markov methods are the most suitable approach due to their flexibility. Guo and 
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Yang [7] also highlighted that Markov analysis shows more flexibility and is the only technique 
that can describe dynamic transitions amongst different states of a system. A number of Markov 
models were evolved in recent years that combine the dynamic behaviour of safety instrumented 
systems and the impact of process demand inflicted on the SIS. A simple Markov model of SIS 
was first created by Bukowski [12] which included both dangerous detected and undetected 
failures in conjunction with the process demand. Jin et al. [23] further developed the preliminary 
model of Bukowski [12] and incorporated the repair rate of dangerous undetected failures for 
safety instrumented system in addition to inclusion of safe failure and repairs. In a separate 
attempt to extend the boundaries of Markov analysis for redundant systems, a Markov chain was 
generated by Liu et al. [24] for a redundant configuration, however, the dangerous detected 
failures were omitted to adopt the core characteristics of a specific safety system known as a 
pressure relief valve. 
 
This paper aims to address this limitation by proposing a unique Markov chain to model the 
unavailability of redundant SIS subject to process demand which includes both dangerous 
detected and undetected failures. Therefore, this model is deemed as one step closer to analysing 
actual behaviour of the redundant configurations since dangerous detected failures influence 
unavailability and safety performance of the safety instrumented systems and cannot be omitted 
in generic SIS architectures. The model available in Jin et al. [23] is extended further by using 
Markov chains for their ability to model accurately and correctly a redundant safety instrumented 
system in low demand. The proposed model integrates the following parameters: diagnostic 
coverage, dangerous undetected failures, dangerous detected failures, repair rates, process 
demand and demand reset rate. The concurrent consideration of process demand and system 
failures (dangerous detected and dangerous undetected) offers a unique opportunity to analyse 
the SIS behaviour using an integrated model as opposed to verifying SIS architecture in isolation 
by exclusion of the process demand. In Section 2 we recall the principle of safety instrumented 
systems. Section 3 entails the mathematical preliminaries and consists of basic elements required 
for reliability modelling. Section 4 is devoted to the Markov models of simple and redundant 
safety instrumented systems followed by a numerical analysis presented in Section 5. 
Applications of the proposed models are discussed in Section 6 based on the results obtained, and 
concluding remarks are drawn at the end of this section. 
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2.0 Safety Instrumented Systems 
2.1 Definition & Key Parameters 
The primary objective of a SIS is to bring the system it supervises to a safe position i.e. in a 
situation where it protects people, environment and/or asset when the Equipment Under Control 
(EUC) deviates from its design intent into a hazardous situation and results in an unwanted 
consequence (e.g. loss of containment leading to explosion, fire, etc.). SISs are frequently utilised 
across process industry to prevent the occurrence of hazardous events or to mitigate the 
consequences of undesirable events. A SIS may execute one or multiple Safety Instrumented 
Functions (SIFs) to attain or maintain a safe state for the EUC (e.g. equipment, system etc.) the 
SIS is protecting against a specific process demand [8]. 
 
A SIS is a system consisting of any combination of sensors, logic solvers and final elements for 
the purpose of taking the supervised process to a safe state when predetermined design 
conditions are violated [13,25]. A SIS (or SIS subsystem) is recognised to have a koon 
configuration when k units of its n total units have to function to provide the required system 
function. Typical SIS configurations comprised of 1oo1, 1oo2, 1oo3, and 2oo3 [22]. In this 
article, only the two first configurations are considered, a 1oo1 system (i.e. a single unit) and a 
1oo2 system. This demarcation is established because we believe that the main features of our 
new model will be illustrated by these simple systems. The Markov models of systems with more 
components will be complex and the main features of the approach will easily disappear in the 
technical calculations. Another reason for this delimitation is that the aforementioned systems 
have been thoroughly assessed with other approaches [1,26], therefore facilitating comparison. 
2.2 Low Demand vs High Demand 
Two separate modes of SIS operation comprised of low demand and high demand are outlined by 
IEC 61508 [1] based on two main criteria: (1) the frequency at which the SIS is expected to 
operate in response to demands, and (2) the anticipated time interval that a failure may remain 
hidden, taking cognisance of the proof test frequency. A SIS is in low demand mode of operation 
if the demand is less than or equal to 1 per year and in high demand mode in other situations 
[1,27]. The demand rate for a SIS may vary from continuous to very low (i.e. infrequent 
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demands) and the duration of each demand may fluctuate from instantaneous up to a rather long 
period (e.g. hours). High demand systems are different from low demand systems, and the same 
analytical techniques can normally not be applied to all systems in various modes of operations. 
FTA and analysis based on RBD are generally not suitable for high demand systems when the 
duration of demands is significant. Several authors have indicated that Markov methods are best 
suited for analysing both high demand and low demand systems [24]. 
 
Despite the clear distinction between the high demand and the low demand mode of operation, 
there are still some underlying issues that cause confusion and problems in the quantification of 
SIS unavailability and safety performance [28]. As such, instead of drawing a clear boundary 
between low demand mode and high demand mode of operation, some authors suggest to 
incorporate the rate of demands into the analysis of safety instrumented systems [10,12,28]. 
2.3 Integrity Levels 
IEC 61508 / 61511 [1,2] present the requirements of safety function and introduce a probabilistic 
approach for the quantitative assessment of the SIS unavailability. The instigation of probability 
into the evaluation of the integrity level necessitated the particular concept of average probability 
of failure on demand (PFD) for low demand mode of operations and probability of failure per 
hour (PFH) for high demand systems. Thus, the PFD is in fact the unavailability of the system 
that signifies its ability to react to hazards, i.e. the safety unavailability [27,29,30]. The 
quantification of this performance is determined by Safety Integrity Levels (SIL). The IEC 61508 
standard [1] establishes 4 classifications of integrity levels based on the PFD and/or PFH. The 
definition of SIL classes can be seen in Table 1: 
 
Table 1 – SIL Levels Definition 
Integrity Level Low Demand High Demand 
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 4 𝑃𝐹𝐷 𝜖 [10−(𝑖+1), 10−𝑖] 𝑃𝐹𝐻 𝜖 [10−(𝑖+5), 10−(𝑖+4)] 
 
Furthermore, IEC 61508 [1] requires to estimate the PFD due to random hardware failures for the 
SIS main elements. The calculations for assessing the performance can consider a large number 
of parameters including but not limited to component failure rates, mean times to repair, 
diagnostic coverage, common cause failures and proof test intervals. The interpretation of PFD 
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and PFH is questioned by various authors [10,12,28] and a common measure for use with both 
low demand and high demand mode is proposed [10,12]. Bukowski [12] calculates the 
probability of being in a state “of fail dangerous and process requires shutdown” based on a 
Markov model, while Misumi et al. [10] used FTA to develop analytical formulae for what they 
call the “hazardous event frequency”. These proposals are promising for the quantification of SIS 
unavailability in general, however further development is required to reflect all relevant 
modelling aspects. In this paper both the PFD and hazardous event frequency will be used as 
performance indicators of the safety instrumented systems. 
3.0 Mathematical Preliminaries 
3.1 Failure Modes 
The SIS failure modes are categorised into two categories, safe failures and dangerous failures. 
Safe failures cause the system to fail safe, e.g. the component operates without demand [31]. The 
safe failures are divided into Safe Detected (SD) and Safe Undetected (SU) failures. Safe failures 
do not have any effect on the ability of the SIS to perform its functions and hence excluded from 
the SIS models in this paper. Dangerous failures prevent the SIS from performing its function, 
i.e. the component does not operate on demand. Similarly, the dangerous failures are divided into 
detected and undetected. The relevant failure modes are [31]: 
 Dangerous Detected (DD): this is a dangerous failure mode, however the failure will be 
detected almost immediately. 
 Dangerous Undetected (DU): this is also a dangerous failure mode that may occur during 
normal operation, however will not be revealed until a proof test (or functional test) is 
carried out or until a real demand for the system occurs. 
Assuming that the 𝜆𝐷𝐷 represents DD failure rate and 𝜆𝐷𝑈 is the DU failure rate, the overall 
dangerous failure rate of a component 𝜆𝐷 is obtained from 
 
𝜆𝐷 = 𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈 (1) 
 
Although majority of the failures are detected via online diagnostic testing system, proof tests are 
normally performed at regular time intervals to reveal and rectify dangerous undetected failures 
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prior to the occurrence of a demand. In order to model the unavailability of a safety instrumented 
system successfully, it is essential to recognise the nature of the failure modes and means of their 
detection. This would allow the development of appropriate strategies to ensure the required 
functionality, reliability and availability of safety instrumented functions as specified in IEC 
61508 [1]. 
3.2 Diagnostic Coverage 
Diagnostic testing is a feature that is sporadically lodged for programmable electronic 
components. A diagnostic test is able to reveal certain types of failures, such as run-time errors 
and signal transmission errors, without interrupting the equipment under control by fully 
operating the main functions of the component. The diagnostics of a pressure transmitter may 
reveal drifting in the signal conversion, without the pressure transmitter responding to a genuine 
high pressure signal. The diagnostic tests are performed usually with an interval between seconds 
and hours. For low demand SISs, this allows sufficient time to carry out repair activities and 
restore the component function prior to the next process demand. Therefore, diagnostic testing is 
a means to timely reveal dangerous failures, and thereby reduce the SIS unavailability; whether 
or not such a testing leads to side-effects is seldom evaluated [32]. IEC 61508 [1] defines the 
Diagnostic Coverage (DC) rate as the ratio between the failure rate of detected dangerous 
failures, 𝜆𝐷𝐷, and the total failure rate of the dangerous failure, 𝜆𝐷 [29]: 
 
𝐷𝐶 =
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷
=
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈
 (2) 
 
As such, the DC rate represents the effectiveness of the diagnostic test. The diagnostic testing can 
detect dangerous failure more or less immediately post occurrence of a failure, however only a 
fraction of dangerous failures can be usually detected. This fraction of dangerous failures is 
defined as DD failures, and the remaining failures that are only detected by proof testing are DU 
failures. Therefore, DC rate distinguishes the dangerous failures into detected and undetected, 
resulting in two distinct failure modes [33] as follows: 
 
𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 𝐷𝐶. 𝜆𝐷    𝜆𝐷𝑈 = (1 − 𝐷𝐶). 𝜆𝐷 (3) 
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The total dangerous failure rate is expressed by the following equation considering the estimated 
DC: 
 
𝜆𝐷 = 𝐷𝐶. 𝜆𝐷 + (1 − 𝐷𝐶). 𝜆𝐷 (4) 
 
The effect of diagnostic testing should be carefully evaluated at design stage of SIS taking 
conscience the influencing parameters such as process demand frequency, diagnostic coverage 
rate, the diagnostic test interval and time required for completion of the repair activity. 
3.3 Testing Strategies & Repair Rates 
3.3.1 Proof Test 
A SIS in low demand mode has the specificity to be periodically tested. The primary objective of 
the proof tests (also known as functional tests) is to detect latent failures and to ensure that the 
SIS meets the requirements and preserves its safety integrity level [34]. As such, the proof tests 
have a fundamental importance for the SIS since they facilitate retaining and improving the SIL 
without making design modifications [34]. When the latent failures are detected, the system can 
be restored to “as good as new” or as close as practical to this condition [1]. Although the 
necessity of proof testing for safety instrumented systems operating in high demand mode is not 
always evident [23], it is essential for low demand SISs to ensure that a dangerous undetected 
failure does not remain hidden for a long time. The proof test can be applied utilising various test 
strategies [35]. The proof test interval denoted by τ, is considered equal to the length of time after 
which a proof test of safety instrumented function is carried out. 
3.3.2 1oo1 System 
For the dangerous failures detected via online diagnostic testing, the equipment downtime is 
limited to the actual repair time, assuming the repair actions are commenced immediately after 
detection of the failure. Therefore, the repair rate of dangerous detected failures, 𝜇𝐷𝐷, can be 
obtained directly from the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) as follows: 
 
𝜇𝐷𝐷 =
1
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
 (5) 
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However, the equipment downtime due to dangerous undetected failures are not solely limited to 
the repair time as the failure is hidden and has not yet been revealed by an online diagnostic test. 
The undetected failures can be revealed either by solicitation of the equipment under control or 
by proof testing, assuming these tests are comprehensive and perfectly accurate (i.e. 100% 
detection rate) in detecting latent failures. The average downtime for undetected failures consists 
of two elements, unknown downtime and known downtime. 
 
Unknown downtime: considering a Poisson process, if one and only one event occurs in the 
interval between 0 and 𝜏, then the timing of when the event occurs is uniform between 0 and τ 
[36,37]. Since the undetected dangerous failure of SIS component is a sole event (i.e. DU failure 
cannot occur more than once during the proof test interval) and is assumed as a random variable 
following a Poisson process (i.e. 𝑁(𝜏) = 1), the probability of failure occurring before time 𝑡 
(𝑡 ≤ 𝜏) is obtained from: 
 
𝑃(𝑇 < 𝑡|𝑁(𝜏) = 1) =
𝑒−𝑡𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑡𝜆𝐷𝑈
1! ) . 𝑒
−𝜆𝐷𝑈(𝜏−𝑡)
𝑒−𝜏𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝜏𝜆𝐷𝑈
1! )
=
𝑡
𝜏
 (6) 
 
As such, the undetected dangerous failure time follows uniform distribution during its test 
interval between 0 and 𝜏. The average downtime prior to detection of the failure is therefore 
equivalent to half of the test interval [8]: 
 
𝑡~𝑈(0, 𝜏) → 𝐸(𝑡) = ∫
1
𝜏
𝜏
0
𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 𝜏 2⁄  (7) 
 
Known downtime: once the failure is detected the equipment downtime due to repair is equivalent 
to MTTR assuming the remedial actions are initiated immediately after detection of the failure 
during proof testing. The time to perform a proof test is often negligible and therefore excluded 
from average downtime. The dangerous undetected repair rate, μDU, can be calculated as: 
 
𝜇𝐷𝑈 =
1
𝜏
2⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
 (8) 
 
Of the two contributing elements to the downtime of undetected failures, the unknown part is 
generally governing the overall downtime of equipment. The failure modes and associated 
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repairs for a 1oo1 SIS are illustrated in Figure 1. The approach undertaken in this paper to obtain 
the “unknown” downtime portion of DU repair rate (𝜇𝐷𝑈), for a 1oo1 system, using the 
relationship between the Poisson process and Uniform distribution (Equation (6)) is exclusive 
and offers an alternative means in obtaining the average downtime for a 1oo1 system. The 
average downtimes computed in this paper are not the same as PFDavg defined in IEC 61508 and 
61511 but are deemed acceptable as they are more conservative than the PFDavg that would be 
computed from the same Markov model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Failure & Repair Rates of 1oo1 SIS 
3.3.3 1oo2 System 
The DD repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝐷, for a 1oo2 configuration is identical to 1oo1 system and can be acquired 
from Equation (5) assuming availability of the diagnostic testing and instantaneous 
commencement of repair action. Similar to the 1oo1 architecture, undetected failures in 1oo2 
system can be revealed upon discharge of a process demand or by performing a proof test, 
assuming precise testing results in detection of unrevealed failures. Considering that the 
equivalent Mean Down Time (MDT) for an undetected failure of a 1oo2 redundant architecture 
is calculated by  𝜏 3⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅, the DU repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝑈, can be obtained from [38]: 
 
𝜇𝐷𝑈 =
1
𝑀𝐷𝑇
=
1
𝜏
3⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
 (9) 
 
The DD and DU repair rates are embedded within the unavailability model proposed in this paper 
in parametric form. The case study in section 5 however will take account of the repair rate 
values accordingly. 
3.4 Demand Rate & Demand Duration 
The process demands are assumed to occur according to a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) 
with rate 𝜆𝐷𝐸, hence the time between two consecutive demands is exponentially distributed with 
  
𝜆𝐷𝑈 
2
𝜏 + 2𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
 
 
𝜆𝐷𝐷 
1
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
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Undetected 
Failure 
Detected 
Failure 
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parameter 𝜆𝐷𝐸 [39]. The duration of each demand is also assumed to be exponentially distributed 
with rate, 𝜇𝐷𝐸. Therefore, the mean demand duration is 
1
𝜇𝐷𝐸⁄ . It is further assumed that the SIS 
is “as good as new” after a successful response to a process demand. When a hazardous event 
occurs, we assume that the system is restored / renewed to the normal functional state. The 
renewal rate is also assumed to be exponentially distributed with rate 𝜇𝑇. 
3.5 Quantitative Evaluation 
The performance evaluation of SIS must be obtained by quantitative methods as stipulated by the 
international standards IEC 61511 [2]. This evaluation is accomplished by the computation of the 
safety function unavailability on demand [14,29]. In this context, Markov chains are widely 
recognised as suitable modelling technique for calculating unavailability of SIS considering all 
possible events (failure, repair, etc) and associated parameters (detected and undetected etc). 
Markov chains offer an appropriate tool for modelling the dynamic behaviour of the SIS under 
study [13,24]. The Markov chains presented in this article follow homogeneous process meaning 
that transition probabilities of Markov chain are considered to be time independent. As such, the 
transitions associated with repairable systems are considered to be constant, i.e. components of 
the system fail at constant failure rate and restored at constant restoration rates [13,24]. This 
assumption is consistent with useful life of components i.e. maturity phase of bathtub curve. 
3.6 Markov Chains 
A Markov chain is a model that transits from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗 with a transition rate 𝑎𝑖𝑗 which 
depends only on the states 𝑖 and 𝑗. Let transition rate matrix 𝑨 = [𝑎𝑖𝑗] be (𝑟 × 𝑟) constructed 
from all transition rates 𝑎𝑖𝑗, as: 
 
𝑨 = [𝑎𝑖𝑗] =
[
 
 
 
 
𝑎11
𝑎21
⋮
⋮
𝑎𝑟1
𝑎12
𝑎22
⋮
⋮
𝑎𝑟2
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋱
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋱
⋯
𝑎1𝑟
𝑎2𝑟
⋮
⋮
𝑎𝑟𝑟]
 
 
 
 
 (10) 
 
where the transition rates are obtained from the following equation assuming the transition 
probability from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 at time 𝑡 is denoted by 𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡): 
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𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = lim
t→0
𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝑡
 (11) 
 
As 𝑨 is a transition rate matrix, the sum of each row of 𝑨 is equal to zero. This means that all 
transition rates 𝑎𝑖𝑗 are equal to or greater than zero and 𝑎𝑖𝑖 = −∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑟
𝑗=1 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 for 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑟. 
The Kolmogorov Forward Equations [8] give: 
 
𝑷(𝑡). 𝑨 = ?́?(𝑡) (12) 
 
where 𝑷(𝑡) = [𝑃1(𝑡), … , 𝑃𝑟(𝑡)], 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) is the probability that the system is in state 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and 
?́?(𝑡) is the time derivative of 𝑷(𝑡). The probability of system being in state 𝑖 in an irreducible 
continuous time Markov process when 𝑡 → ∞ is irrespective of the initial state of the system and 
constant: 
 
𝜋𝑖 = lim
t→∞
𝑃𝑖(𝑡)    𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑟 (13) 
& 
lim 
t→∞
?́?𝑖(𝑡) = 0     𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑟 (14) 
 
The steady state probability for state 𝑖, 𝜋𝑖, is the long-run probability that the system is in state 𝑖. 
It also signifies the mean proportion of time the system is in state 𝑖 [23]. The vector 𝚷 =
[𝜋1, … , 𝜋𝑟] represents the steady state probabilities and the fact that the sum of the steady state 
probabilities is always equal to 1. 
 
∑𝜋𝑖
𝑟
𝑖=1
= 1 (15) 
 
The following linear system of equations can be used for a homogeneous Markov chain to 
calculate the steady state probabilities [8]: 
 
𝚷.𝑨 = 0 (16) 
 
In a Markov model, the frequency of entering a hazardous state can be obtained directly from the 
transition diagram. The system transits to the hazardous state 0 when a demand is inflicted on it 
whilst the SIS is failed dangerously either detected or undetected. The hazardous event frequency 
(HEF) is equal to the visit frequency to state 0, from any other possible states [8], as: 
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𝐻𝐸𝐹 = ∑𝑎𝑖0
𝑟
𝑖=1
𝜋𝑖  (17) 
 
In this article, we aim to investigate the unavailability of safety instrumented system where 
redundancy in components is included within the architectural design of the system. This takes 
into account the process demand rate and duration of demand for safety instrumented systems 
operating in low demand mode. The considered framework for unavailability assessment of 
redundant SIS subject to process demand using Markov chains is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Framework for Unavailability Assessment for Redundant SIS Subject to Process Demand 
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The underlying assumptions of the SIS models developed in this paper are as follows: 
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 The time between demands is exponentially distributed (the process demand rate is 
constant). 
 The process demand duration and restoration time from hazardous state are exponentially 
distributed. 
 Proof tests are comprehensive (100% accurate) and carried out periodically in line with test 
intervals of the system. 
 A single maintenance team is available on site. 
 The system is studied over one test interval only. 
 The system can be considered “as good as new” post repair or a proof test. 
3.7.2 Transition Rates 
In order to develop state transition diagram it is essential to define a set of transition rates 
representing the physical status of the system. The system transition rates including dangerous 
undetected / detected and associated repair rates are listed as follows: 
 𝜆𝐷𝑈 DU failure rate - the frequency that a DU failure occurs per hour 
 𝜆𝐷𝐷 DD failure rate - the frequency that a DD failure occurs per hour 
 𝜇𝐷𝑈 DU repair rate - the frequency that a reset from the DU occurs per hour 
 𝜇𝐷𝐷 DD repair rate - the frequency that an active repair of DD state occurs per hour 
 
Furthermore, the transition rates due to imposition of process demand and system reinstatement 
when process demand is nullified are as follows: 
 𝜆𝐷𝐸 process demand rate - the frequency that a process demand occurs per hour 
 𝜇𝐷𝐸 demand reset rate - the frequency that the process demand recovers per hour 
System restoration from the hazardous state to the fully functional state is: 
 𝜇𝑇 renewal rate - the frequency that a renewal from hazardous state occurs per hour 
3.7.3 Proof Test Coverage & Common Cause Failures 
The model presented in this paper excludes two variables, consisting of Proof Test Coverage 
(PTC) and Common Cause Failures (CCFs). We discuss in this section the justification and 
potential implications of their incorporation within the Markov model. 
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The impact of proof test coverage (also known as imperfect proof test) was discarded in various 
publications including studies based on Markovian technique (e.g. Jin et al. [23], Liu et al. [24], 
Zhang et al. [38] etc.) and those that implemented non-Markovian methodology (e.g. Wang et al. 
[16] etc.) on the basis of 100% detection rate during proof tests. This is also evident in the IEC 
61508 approach where the formulas do not include the effects of non-perfect proof-testing [19]. 
Similarly, the assessment of proof test coverage was not explored further in this paper 
considering that proof tests are assumed as comprehensive (100% accurate) and carried out 
periodically in line with test intervals of the system. However, where the proof tests are not 
perfect (i.e. not 100% accurate) or when proof tests can be 100% accurate but are not completely 
executed, then the PTC ratio shall be considered in accordance with the latest edition of IEC 
61511 (2016). This implies the identification of the DU failures which, inherently, can never be 
detected by proof tests. Inclusion of PTC within the unavailability model may potentially lead to 
significant change in the structure of the Markov chain. Nevertheless, one shall analyse the 
model’s behaviour more accurately prior to incorporation of PTC as an additional variable. The 
proposed unavailability model in this paper however provides a platform to include the PTC in 
the next phase of its development. 
 
A query may arise as once proof test coverage is included in the state diagram, the assumption of 
constant repair rates no longer applies for all states. Thus, without the assumption of constant 
repair rates, unavailability cannot be determined by considering steady state equations because 
without constant repair rates a steady state does not occur and therefore the model needs to be 
solved numerically. A separate study conducted by Bukowski [40] to evaluate the impact of non-
exponential repair times (non-constant repair rates) on the steady state probabilities in Markov 
models concludes that exponential repair-time densities can be used in Markov models and will 
generate the same results as more complicated non-exponential repair-time densities. As such, 
the assumption of constant repair rates (regardless of whether the actual repair rates are 
exponentially distributed or not) used in the proposed Markov chain is justifiable and the 
unavailability model proposed in this paper provides a reasonably accurate result. This is also 
valid when incorporation of proof test coverage variable results in alteration of repair rate density 
functions. 
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The CCF is similarly excluded from the proposed Markov model. However, in order to include 
CCFs, the rate of independent (ID) failures shall be segregated from the total failure rate, such 
that (1 − 𝛽𝑈)𝜆𝐷𝑈 / (1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 (where 𝛽𝑈 and 𝛽𝐷 represent CCF factors for DU and DD 
failures respectively) is used instead of 𝜆𝐷𝑈 / 𝜆𝐷𝐷 for independent DU / DD failures. 
Subsequently, CCF rates (𝛽𝑈𝜆𝐷𝑈 / 𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷) leading to subsystem unavailability are required to be 
clearly identified for redundant subsystems. Furthermore, a repair strategy for the Markov model 
shall be established to identify whether a single stage repair policy would be feasible or multiple 
stage repair strategy of CCF can be used instead. On this basis, incorporation of CCF into the 
proposed Markov model would merit a standalone study where the impact of CCF factor can be 
studied in detail and behaviour of the model can be examined thoroughly. Consequently, 
evaluation of CCF was excluded in the scope of this paper and it may be a topic for future work. 
 
The effect of proof test coverage and CCF remain as one of the areas for further improvement of 
the proposed model since it was primarily developed to investigate the combined effect of 
process demand and SIS failure modes only. Noting the limitations embedded within the other 
SIL verification methodologies (e.g. FTA, RBD, Simplified Equations etc), specific attention is 
needed in this area to introduce these variables into the Markov chains to enhance their 
applicability and precision in assessing the SIS PFD value. 
4.0 Markov Models for SIS 
In this section two reliability models for 1oo1 and 1oo2 safety instrumented systems are 
developed using Markov chains. We start by analysing a simple 1oo1 SIS by re-constructing the 
state transition diagram, and then introduce a new reliability model for a 1oo2 redundant SIS. 
4.1 1oo1 SIS Markov Model 
A Markov model for a simple safety instrumented system of 1oo1 architecture was originally 
presented by Jin et al. [23]. The system’s situation consists of the combined characteristics of the 
SIS state and process demand levied on the SIS. A SIS is in “available” state when it is able to 
respond to a process demand upon manifestation. In this case the SIS has not failed due to DU or 
DD failure and has not been spuriously activated. SIS is defined as “functioning” state when it is 
responding to a process demand. 
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Table 2 – States of 1oo1 SIS 
System State Property Demand State 
0 Hazardous On Demand 
1 DU Failure No Demand 
2 Functional On Demand 
3 DD Failure No Demand 
4 Functional No Demand 
 
The possible states of the system are listed in Table 2 and the Markov transition diagram is 
shown in Figure 3 where the nodes correspond to the system states and arrows represent system 
transition from one state to another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – State Transition Diagram for a 1oo1 SIS 
State 4 denotes the initial and normal operating state in the transition diagram, where the SIS is 
available but there is no demand for activation of the SIS. The system transits to state 1 or 3 from 
state 4, if SIS endures a DU or DD failure while there is no process demand on the SIS. 
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Imposition of a process demand at either of these two states will result in occurrence of the 
hazardous event. State 2 represents the functioning state where the SIS is responding to a process 
demand. The system enters hazardous state 0 from state 2 when either of DU or DD failure 
occurs whilst the SIS is responding to a process demand in functional status. State 0 (hazardous 
state) represents a state where the SIS sustains a failure (DU or DD) and there is a demand for 
activation of the SIS. 
 
Repair of a DU failure in state 1 or DD failure in state 3 will lead to system transition to the fully 
functioning state by the corresponding repair rate (𝜇𝐷𝑈 or 𝜇𝐷𝐷). A restoration action is initiated 
when system enters the hazardous state (state 0) and the system is started up again in a “as good 
as new condition” in state 4 when the restoration is completed. The mean time required to restore 
the system from state 0 to state 4 is considered to be 1 𝜇𝑇⁄ . It shall be noted that the relevance of 
this assumption may vary for some applications as start up after a hazardous event may not be 
practical. In a worst credible event scenario, the entire system may be demolished due to a 
consequence of the hazardous event. The steady state equations [8] corresponding to the state 
transition diagram in Figure 3 are as follows: 
 
𝜇𝑇𝑃0 = 𝜆𝐷𝐸(𝑃1 + 𝑃3) + (𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃2 
𝜇𝐷𝐸𝑃2 = 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃4 − (𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃2 
𝜇𝐷𝑈𝑃1 = 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃4 − 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃1 
𝜇𝐷𝐷𝑃3 = 𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑃4 − 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃3 
(18) 
 
Taking into account that the sum of steady state probabilities is equal to 1: 
 
𝑃0 + 𝑃1 + 𝑃2 + 𝑃3 + 𝑃4 = 1 (19) 
 
The 1oo1 SIS will not be able to respond to a process demand when it is in state 1 or 3, hence the 
PFD of the safety system is given by: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 = 𝑃1 + 𝑃3 (20) 
 
The frequency (per hour) of entering into the hazardous state is equivalent to the visit frequency 
to state 0, from any other state as follows: 
 
𝐻𝐸𝐹 = 𝜆𝐷𝐸(𝑃1 + 𝑃3) + (𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃2 (21) 
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4.2 1oo2 SIS Markov Model 
Another common configuration for safety instrumented systems is 1oo2, where the protection 
function is available if at least one of the two components is operational. The redundancy 
improves availability of the system, however may bring common cause failures which occur 
when two or more components fail simultaneously due to a common stressor. In this article CCF 
is not considered to focus on unavailability model. Using the 1oo1 system as a platform, we 
intend to introduce a new Markov chain for a 1oo2 redundant SIS by inclusion of both DD and 
DU failures for the first time as well as incorporating process demand within the unavailability 
model. The general underlying assumptions listed in section 3.7.1 are all valid for 1oo2 SIS 
model. The possible states of the system are outlined in Table 3 and the Markov transition 
diagram is illustrated in Figure 4: 
Table 3 – States of a 1oo2 SIS 
System State Property Demand State 
0 Hazardous On Demand 
1 2 DD No Demand 
2 2 DU No Demand 
3 1 Functional, 1 DD On Demand 
4 1 Functional, 1 DU On Demand 
5 1 DD, 1 DU No Demand 
6 1 Functional, 1 DD No Demand 
7 1 Functional, 1 DU No Demand 
8 2 Functional On Demand 
9 2 Functional No Demand 
 
In a 1oo2 redundant system, single failure does not impact system ability to respond to a process 
demand and hence has no impact on its availability. In this case SIS is still defined as in 
“functioning” state. Taking this into cognisance we describe the structure of the Markov chain 
for a 1oo2 safety instrumented system developed in this paper. Similar to the simple 
configuration, the 1oo2 safety system consists of the combined effect of the SIS states and 
process demand levied on the safety instrumented system. Consistent with the 1oo1 system, safe 
failures are excluded for modelling purpose since the probability of failure on demand is 
characterised by dangerous failures only. The system transitions due to dangerous failures, 𝜆𝐷𝑈 
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and 𝜆𝐷𝐷, and associated repairs, 𝜇𝐷𝑈 and 𝜇𝐷𝐷, are intact. Furthermore, the process demand and 
its reset rates as well as renewal rate for the 1oo1 system can be adopted for a 1oo2, assuming 
that the redundant system can be used as a replacement of the simple architecture and in the same 
industrial application to reduce unavailability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – State Transition Diagram for a 1oo2 SIS 
Starting with system in fully functional status and no process demand (i.e. state 9), the SIS fails 
dangerously (detected) while there is no process demand and transits from state 9 to state 6 with 
failure rate 2𝜆𝐷𝐷. This is a minimum of 2 independent DD failures associated with the system 
components and it can be interpreted as the system transiting to state 6 when one of the two 
redundant components has a DD failure. The system transits back to the fully functional state 9 
with repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝐷, where repair of the failed component takes place. State 7 is similar to state 
6, but the SIS has a DU rather than a DD failure. In the proposed model, the dangerous 
undetected failures can only be repaired during proof testing. The deterministic nature of the DU 
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repair rate is reflected in Equations (8) and (9) and embedded within the Markov model. Noting 
the conclusion of the study conducted by Bukowski [40], the assumption of constant repair rates 
is justifiable. 
 
From state 6 or 7 the system transits into state 3 or 4 when a process demand is levied on the 
system. In state 3 and 4, the SIS is responding to a process demand with only one component 
functioning since the other component is in failed status. The safety system alternates between 
states 3 and 6 (or, 4 and 7) depending on manifestation of a process demand or removal of the 
demand when it ends. Failure of the remaining component whilst the system is in state 3 or 4, 
results in system entering the hazardous state. Regardless of whether the dangerous failure of the 
remaining component is detected or undetected (DD or DU), the hazardous event occurs with the 
first failure. In state 8, the SIS is responding to a process demand when both components are 
functional. Upon fulfilment of the process demand the system transits back to the original state 9. 
DD or DU failure of any of the components whilst the system is responding to a process demand 
in state 8, will lead to the system transition from state 8 to states 3 or 4, depending on whether 
the dangerous failure is detected or unknown until next proof test interval. If another dangerous 
failure arises either detected or undetected when one of the components is already failed in states 
6 or 7, the system will move to one of the nodes 1, 2 or 5. Upon identification of the failed 
component and its repair in any of these states with 𝜇𝐷𝑈 or 𝜇𝐷𝐷 repair rate, the system transits to 
the previous states, 6 and 7 respectively. It is necessary to highlight that there is no process 
demand enforced on the system in any of the states 1 - 2 and 5 - 7. 
 
The system enters hazardous state 0 from state 1 or 2 when a process demand occurs with 𝜆𝐷𝐸 
rate whilst both components are in failed states either due to two consecutive DD failures (9-6-1), 
two DU failures (9-7-2), or a combination of DD and DU failures (9-6-5 or 9-7-5). Alternatively 
the hazardous state 0 is reached from state 3 or 4 where system is responding to a process 
demand with the only remaining functional component (9-6-3, 9-8-3, 9-7-4 and 9-8-4) and it fails 
dangerously, either detected or undetected, resulting in removal of the protection layer and 
exposure to a hazardous event. 
 
Similar to the 1oo1 system, when the system enters the hazardous state 0, a restoration action is 
initiated. Upon completion of the restoration with mean time 1 𝜇𝑇⁄ , the system is reinstated to “as 
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good as new condition” in state 9. This is only achievable where the hazardous event is either 
repeatable or renewable as outlined by Youshiamura [41]. It is necessary to highlight that the 
abovementioned scenarios involve dangerous system failures only and do not entail CCF failures. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that only one component can be repaired at a time since only one 
maintenance team is available onsite. The primary property of any Markov process also known 
as Markov property is that the future status of the system depends on the current status of the 
system only and is independent of its past circumstances. This property is embedded within the 
Markov chain developed for the 1oo2 SIS as a memoryless system. Additionally, the system 
fulfils the secondary feature of Markov process recognised as stationary property in which the 
transition probabilities from one state to another state remain constant with time. As such, the 
steady state probabilities (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑖 = 0,… ,9) can be derived from the transition rate matrix. The 
steady state equations corresponding to the Markov transition diagram are as follows: 
 
𝜇𝐷𝐷(𝑃6 − 𝑃1) − (𝜇𝐷𝑈𝑃5 + 𝜇𝐷𝐸𝑃3) = 𝜆𝐷𝐷(2𝑃9 − 𝑃6) − (𝜆𝐷𝐸 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃6 
𝜇𝐷𝑈(𝑃7 − 𝑃2) − (𝜇𝐷𝐷𝑃5 + 𝜇𝐷𝐸𝑃4) = 𝜆𝐷𝑈(2𝑃9 − 𝑃7) − (𝜆𝐷𝐸 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑃7 
𝜇𝐷𝐸𝑃8 − (𝜇𝐷𝐷𝑃3 + 𝜇𝐷𝑈𝑃4) = 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃9 − 2(𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃8 
(𝜇𝐷𝐸 + 𝜇𝐷𝐷)𝑃3 = 2𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑃8 + 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃6 − (𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃3 
(𝜇𝐷𝐸 + 𝜇𝐷𝑈)𝑃4 = 2𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃8 + 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃7 − (𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃4 
𝜇𝑇𝑃0 = 𝜆𝐷𝐸(𝑃1 + 𝑃2 + 𝑃5) + (𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)(𝑃3 + 𝑃4) 
(𝜇𝐷𝐷 + 𝜇𝐷𝑈)𝑃5 = 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃6 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑃7 − 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃5 
𝜇𝐷𝑈𝑃2 = 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃7 − 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃2 
𝜇𝐷𝐷𝑃1 = 𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑃6 − 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃1 
(22) 
 
Taking cognisance that the summation of steady state probabilities is unity: 
 
∑𝑃𝑖
9
𝑖=0
= 1 (23) 
 
The 1oo2 SIS will not be able to respond to a process demand when it is in states 1, 2 or 5, 
therefore the PFD of the safety system is equivalent to: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 = 𝑃1 + 𝑃2 + 𝑃5 (24) 
 
The frequency (per hour) of entering into the hazardous state from all possible states is: 
 
𝐻𝐸𝐹 = 𝜆𝐷𝐸(𝑃1 + 𝑃2 + 𝑃5) + (𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)(𝑃3 + 𝑃4) (25) 
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A comparison between the Markov chains for 1oo1 and 1oo2 SIS configurations reveals that the 
number of nodes (corresponding to the number of steady state equations) has increased from 5 to 
10 which results in a significant increase in the dimension of the transition rate matrix and 
subsequently computational effort required to solve the model. This highlights once more the 
difficulty associated with handling large Markov models as they require a substantial amount of 
calculation. Therefore, it has been widely recognised that the design of Markov models for a 
complex SIS architecture is challenging and error prone [23]. 
5.0 Case Study 
The Chemical Reactor Protection System (CRPS) shown in Figure 5 has been studied in [33,35] 
and is used for illustration of the newly developed model in this paper. The proposed Markov 
chain is applied to the protection system for calculating its unavailability against high 
temperature and/or high pressure produced within the chemical reactor and the frequency at 
which the system enters hazardous conditions. The reactor is a pressurised container deigned to 
process volatile hydrocarbon multiphase fluid which segregates gas and liquid products post 
completion of an exothermic reaction. This system is predominantly used in downstream process 
facilities such as refineries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – CRPS Process Flow Diagram 
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5.1 High Integrity Pressure & Temperature Protection System 
The protection system implemented to the chemical reactor consists of three distinct elements: 
sensor subsystem including pressure and temperature transmitters, logic solver subsystem and 
flow control subsystem. Upon detection of either high pressure or high temperature within the 
vessel, the final element shuts down the supply in order to prevent a runaway reaction [35]. Each 
subsystem is designed with sufficient level of redundancy encompassed within their 
configuration. The studied pressure and temperature safety system is composed of the following 
subsystems: 
 The field instrumentation comprises of two independent sets of transmitters: Temperature 
Transmitter (TT) and Pressure Transmitter (PT); configured in 1oo1 and 1oo2 architectures 
respectively. 
 The Logic Solver (LS) subsystem which is a programmable unit located in the control room 
and structured in 1oo3 redundant architecture. 
 The Flow Control (FC) subsystem structured in 1oo3 architecture made up of three Flow 
Control Valves (FCVs) and their associated actuators. 
5.2 Hazardous Event 
Where pressure or temperature within the reactor exceeds the defined design envelop, the SIS 
shuts down the incoming flow and maintains the safe status of the equipment under control. The 
reactor is neither connected to the flare system nor provided with an atmospheric release. As 
such, the high integrity SIS is the last and only layer of protection safeguarding the reactor 
against extreme pressure and/or temperature. Failure of the SIS will lead to rupture of the reactor 
and subsequent loss of containment. 
 
It is assumed that loss of containment will be contained within a dedicated dike and subsequently 
drained via the plant’s closed drain system. Both dike and drain system are suitably designed to 
accommodate full release of reactor containment. The drain system directs the excess fluids into 
a separate container and as such eliminates personnel exposure to toxic / flammable fumes and 
also minimises environmental damage so far as reasonably practicable. Furthermore, the existing 
plant fire and gas detection system is deemed as sufficient in detecting the gas cloud resulting 
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from the loss of containment and to initiate a high level executive action to shutdown the plant 
and isolate all energy feeds which could act as potential ignition sources. Therefore, fire and 
explosion are discounted from the potential range of consequences and the ramification of the 
hazardous event is limited to minor to moderate asset damage only with no safety and 
environmental impact perceived. Noting the aforementioned, the hazardous event for this case is 
considered as repeatable or renewable [41] only. 
5.3 Process Demand 
Process demand on the SIS will be triggered by uncontrolled liquid level resulting in pressure 
spike within the reactor. Alternatively, process demand is generated due to excessive pressure 
and/or temperature, released as a result of exothermic chemical reaction within the vessel. The 
underlying cause for the later could be due to change in composition of the upstream fluid. 
5.4 Calculation of System Unavailability 
5.4.1 Overall Model 
The reliability block diagram of the CRPS is illustrated in Figure 6. In order to compute the 
system unavailability, the proof test interval associated with test frequency of the SIS is required 
to be established. Some applications require the use of different test intervals of each subsystem 
of the CRPS, however in this study we assume that all subsystems are tested independently of 
each other at the their own proof test interval of 𝜏𝑖. Thus, the complexity of the SIS does not 
increase as each subsystem can be studied independently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – CRPS Reliability Block Diagram 
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The unavailability of SIS individual subsystems for the CRPS was calculated as follows: 
 The 1oo1 temperature transmitter and 1oo2 pressure transmitter sensor subsystems were 
analysed using the proposed unavailability models presented in this paper; 
 The 1oo3 logic solver and 1oo3 flow control subsystems were solved using the simplified 
formula from IEC 61508. 
 
The overall system unavailability can be calculated by the combination of probability of failure 
on demand of all the three subsystems providing the safety function. It is expressed by the 
following expression: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑆 = (𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑇𝑇 . 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑇) + 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐿𝑆 + 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐹𝐶  (26) 
 
The PDS handbook [42] provides the following estimates for individual components of the CRPS 
(topside equipment): 
Table 4 – CRPS Reliability Data 
Parameters Unit 𝑃𝑇𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑖 𝐿𝑆𝑖 𝐹𝐶𝑖 
𝜆𝐷𝑈 × 10
−6 ℎ⁄  0.3 0.3 0.8 3.5 
𝐷𝐶 − 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.2 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 ℎ 8 8 8 8 
𝜏 ℎ 8,760 8,760 17,520 17,520 
 
It is assumed that the logic solver subsystem is a control logic unit programmable safety system 
which consists of an analogue input, a single processing unit (CPU) / logic and a digital output 
configuration. The failure rates associated with the flow control valves are related to shutdown 
service only (i.e. normally not operated). The failures rates of the actuators, pilot / solenoid valve 
etc are excluded from this analysis. The 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 value for all SIS components is set at 8 hours, 
consistent with the IEC 61508 [1] recommended value. In addition, it is assumed that various 
independent upstream and downstream protection layers are incorporated within the design of the 
process system leading to a low frequency of process upset which may generate demand on SIS. 
Where a demand is inflicted on the SIS, it is expected to be a short duration given the nature of 
system operability. Thus, the process demand rate and its duration are considered as 𝜆𝐷𝐸 = 1 ×
10−5 and 𝜇𝐷𝐸 = 1 × 10
−4 per hour respectively. The restoration rate from hazardous event is 
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also projected as 𝜇𝑇 = 1 × 10
−3 per hour [24] which is equivalent to 1000h mean restoration 
time after a hazardous event. This estimate is deemed appropriate as we are addressing repeatable 
and/or renewable hazardous event only, although the severity of the consequence dominates this 
value. 
5.4.2 Analysis of Sensor Subsystem 
The sensor subsystem consists of two independent initiators, temperature transmitter and 
pressure transmitter. The temperature transmitter subsystem is a 1oo1 system and as such can be 
analysed using the Markov chain presented in Figure 3. The interval between proof tests for the 
TT subsystem is assumed to be one year or 𝜏 = 8,760h. These estimates are uncertain and will 
obviously be strongly dependent on the particular maintenance arrangements. Using 𝜏 = 8,760h 
and 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 = 8h, the repair rate of dangerous undetected for temperature transmitter is calculated 
as 𝜇𝐷𝑈 = 2.28 × 10
−4 per hour, as per Equation (8). The pressure transmitter subsystem is a 
1oo2 redundant system and can be analysed using the Markov chain presented in Figure 4. 
Similarly, the repair rate of dangerous undetected for pressure transmitter is calculated as 𝜇𝐷𝑈 =
3.42 × 10−4 per hour, as per Equation (9). The state equations were solved using MATLAB for 
both temperature and pressure transmitter subsystems corresponding to 1oo1 and 1oo2 models 
presented in this paper. Since the reliability data sets are identical for both subsystems, the results 
are comparable. The calculated PFD and HEF values are outlined in Table 5: 
Table 5 – Analysis of Sensor Subsystem 
Performance Indicator 1oo1 SIS 1oo2 SIS 
PFD 1.15 × 10−3 1.36 × 10−6 
HEF 7.46 × 10−8 1.25 × 10−10 
 
The PFD for 1oo2 SIS is lower than 1oo1 by 3 orders of magnitude indicating a considerably 
more available system in comparison with a simple SIS. The redundant SIS enters hazardous 
event with a lower frequency when compared to the simple system, resulting in significant 
enhancement in safety performance of the system. This is also an advantage of utilising a 
redundant configuration as opposed to a single transmitter system with no redundancy. These 
outcomes are in line with the general philosophy that utilising a redundant architecture will 
reduce the unavailability and improve the safety performance of the system. 
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There is a distinction between the sensor subsystem and the other two elements of the SIS (i.e. 
logic solver and flow control subsystems) in Figure 5. In the case study conducted in this paper 
the process demand imposition only occurs on the sensors due to rise in pressure / temperature as 
a result of exothermic chemical reaction. Whereas the SIS logic solver and flow control 
subsystems in this case only facilitate the discharge of the safety function if the operation 
conditions exceed design envelops. As such, the Markov model presented in this paper was only 
applied to the sensor subsystems due to direct impact of the process demand. 
5.4.3 Analysis of Protection System 
The unavailability of 1oo3 logic solver and flow control subsystems can be calculated in 
accordance with IEC 61508 [1]. Since there is no direct process demand imposition on the logic 
solver and flow control subsystems, the IEC 61508 simplified formula is deemed as sufficient in 
providing a reasonably accurate approximation for the PFD values of these elements. Taking into 
account that the common cause failure is discarded in this study and assuming that any diagnostic 
testing would only report the faults identified and will not change the output states or the voting 
logic, the average probability of failure on demand for the 1oo3 architecture provided by the IEC 
61508 standard can be simplified as follows: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐿𝑆 𝐹𝐶⁄ = 6(𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3 ∏[
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 +
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝜆𝐷
(
𝜏
𝑛
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)]
4
𝑛=2
 (27) 
 
The Mean Repair Time (MRT) is presumed identical to the MTTR considering that the repair is 
commenced instantaneously upon detection and the delay time associated with logistics is 
annulled. In this case if 𝜆𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 ≪ 0.1, one can justify that (𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏)
3 4⁄  is a good approximation 
[43] to the value of PFD for the logic solver and flow control subsystems. Considering that the 
Markov model assumes 100% detection rate during proof tests, the elimination of proof test 
coverage and consequently use of approximate formula is justified and in line with the 
requirements of international standards IEC 61508. 
 
The overall unavailability of the protection system is calculated as 5.83 × 10−5 corresponding to 
safety integrity level 4. It shall be noted that the sensor subsystems form minimal portion of 
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system unavailability in comparison with final elements of the protection system as presented in 
Figure 7 for the CRPS subsystems. This is predominantly due to the technological variation 
between detection of process abnormality versus mechanical completion of an executive action 
i.e. closure of the flow control valves. Therefore, where changing in test frequency of the 
components is deemed feasible, the final elements shall be given a higher priority. 
 
Figure 7 – Comparative Unavailability of Chemical Reaction Protection Subsystems 
Exclusion of proof test coverage where perfect detection rate during the proof test is not 
achievable for the sensor subsystem may give slightly optimistic result but not prevailing in 
determination of overall system unavailability noting that the large portion of the system 
unavailability is dominated by final elements. Therefore, the impact of the PTC is negligible for 
the sensor subsystem and will not lead to unsafe results. 
5.4.4 Impact of Proof Test Interval on Unavailability 
The optimisation of proof test interval during SIS lifecycle is always a stimulating topic for 
functional safety engineers. Whilst the reduced proof text intervals will generally result in 
reduction of SIS unavailability, the expenditure associated with conducting the proof tests 
including labour, equipment and cost of shutdown will be determining factors. As such, a balance 
between expenditure and maintaining system integrity is required to be established. The 
behaviour of proposed 1oo1 and 1oo2 SIS models against various proof test intervals, 𝜏, are 
shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. The proof test intervals used for illustration purpose cover 
shorter periods consisting of 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 month intervals as well as longer durations 
including 1.5, 2, 3, 5 and 10 years. It is observed that the unavailability of both 1oo1 and 1oo2 
Sensor Subsystem Logic Solver Subsystem Flow Control Subsystem
6.88 × 10−7 
5.76 × 10−5 
1.56 × 10−9 
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systems elevates gradually alongside the proof test duration, although the increase in 1oo2 
system unavailability is steeper. The unavailability of redundant configuration is substantially 
lower than the simple structure, reflecting the prominence of redundancy. 
 
In order to illustrate the visit frequency to hazardous event we use -log10 scale on the y-axis, 
hence any increase in HEF, results in acquisition of lower values. Although the frequency of 
1oo1 system entering hazardous state is relatively constant throughout the 10 test intervals as 
shown in Figure 9, increase in hazardous event frequency for 1oo2 system is clearly visible in the 
same range. Nevertheless, the hazardous event frequency for a redundant 1oo2 configuration 
remains extensively lower than a simple 1oo1 system. 
  
Figure 8 – PFD comparison of 1oo1 vs 1oo2 SIS with 
varying 𝜏 value 
Figure 9 – HEF comparison of 1oo1 vs 1oo2 SIS with 
varying 𝜏 value 
 
The minimum SIS proof test interval may not be achievable as other influencing elements play a 
significant role in determination of the optimum test interval. This is despite the augment of 
unavailability and hazardous event frequency resulting in deterioration of the system 
performance. The above illustration indicates that the proposed 1oo2 SIS model is in line with 
the anticipated trend in comparison with 1oo1 simple system. 
5.5 Sensitivity Examination of 1oo2 SIS 
5.5.1 The effect of 𝝀𝑫𝑬 and 𝝁𝑫𝑬 
We now examine the effect of varying process system parameters including the demand rate and 
demand duration. First we study the effect of varying the demand rate, 𝜆𝐷𝐸. As such the demand 
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duration, 𝜇𝐷𝐸, is considered as a constant in this step. The effect of varying 𝜆𝐷𝐸 on the PFD and 
HEF are evaluated for demand durations equal to 10-6, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3 and 10-2 respectively. In 
order to illustrate the probability of failure on demand and visit frequency to hazardous state in a 
common figure we use logarithmic scale on both the x-axis and y-axis. The PFD and HEF are 
functions of 𝜆𝐷𝐸 for the specified duration of demands as seen in Figure 10 and Figure 11 
respectively. 
  
Figure 10 – PFD verses 𝜆𝐷𝐸 with varying demand 
durations for a 1oo2 SIS system 
Figure 11 – HEF verses 𝜆𝐷𝐸 with varying demand 
durations for a 1oo2 SIS system 
 
Increase in process demand means shifting from low demand mode of operations to high demand 
mode where safety instrumented system has to respond more frequently to demands from the 
process system. Although the model proposed in this paper is solely focused on low demand 
mode of operation, the increase in process demand is evaluated to analyse behaviour of the 
system in those scenarios. From Figure 10 the PFD descends as the demand rate rises for various 
𝜇𝐷𝐸. It is however observed that the change in PFD value is not apparent for less frequent 
process demand rates across the selected range of demand durations. This behaviour can be 
justified considering that when the demand frequency increases, the system will respond to the 
process demand more frequently. Therefore, the SIS function is discharged regularly resulting in 
revealing DU failures. Hence, the system unavailability due to undetected dangerous failure will 
reduce, leading to a reduction in PFD value. The frequency of visiting the hazardous state 
increases whilst 𝜆𝐷𝐸 obtains higher values for a 1oo2 SIS as per Figure 11. This is due to 
dominant impact of 𝜆𝐷𝐸 in Equation (25) that dictates an increase in HEF despite reduction of 
PFD. 
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To study the influence of demand duration, the demand rate, 𝜆𝐷𝐸, is considered to be constant. 
Calculations are performed for five different values of demand rates including 10-7, 10-6, 10-5, 10-
4 and 10-3. The results of these calculations are illustrated in Figure 12 and Figure 13 representing 
the effect of varying demand rates on the PFD and HEF in turn. The unavailability increases as 
the demand duration reduces according to the result shown in Figure 12. This might be predicted 
by the following argument: as the demand duration reduces (demand reset rate rises), the system 
devotes lower portion of time in responding to the process demand in states 3, 4, and 8 in Figure 
4, hence resulting in higher possibility of system conveyancing to the remaining system states 
including 1, 2 and 5. This leads to higher system unavailability considering that the PFD for 1oo2 
SIS is defined as per Equation (24). As the demand duration reduces, the HEF descends in Figure 
13 indicating improvement in SIS safety performance for all 𝜆𝐷𝐸 values. The frequency of 
system entering hazardous event shows minute sensitivity to changes in demand duration for 
more frequent demand rates. 
  
Figure 12 – PFD verses 𝜇𝐷𝐸 with varying demand rates 
for a 1oo2 SIS system 
Figure 13 – HEF verses 𝜇𝐷𝐸 with varying demand rates 
for a 1oo2 SIS system 
 
The outcome of this sensitivity investigation is consistent with the observations of Liu et al. [24] 
for the effect of 𝜆𝐷𝐸 and 𝜇𝐷𝐸 on a 1oo2 Pressure Relive Valve (PRV) system in which both the 
PFD and HEF exhibit a similar trend. 
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5.5.2 The effect of 𝝀𝑫𝑼 and 𝝁𝑫𝑼 
To explore the impact of DU failure rate, 𝜆𝐷𝑈, on PFD and HEF, we assume 𝜇𝐷𝑈 as a constant 
and repeat the analysis when DU repair rate equals to 10-5, 10-4, 10-3, 10-2 and 10-1. Where the 
component failure rate increases, the system will be less available to respond to process demand 
and this is obvious in Figure 14. The PFD for the selected range of 𝜇𝐷𝑈 ascend sharply and 
congregate at 100% unavailability as the DU failure rate gains higher values. This behaviour is 
also observed in the system entering hazardous scenario in Figure 15. As shown the exposure to 
hazardous event increases since the system components fail more frequently, reducing system 
availability to respond to process demand. The HEF curves converge and remain constant for 
higher DU failure frequencies across the designated values for 𝜇𝐷𝑈. 
  
Figure 14 – PFD verses 𝜆𝐷𝑈 with varying DU repair 
rates for a 1oo2 SIS system 
Figure 15 – HEF verses 𝜆𝐷𝑈 with varying DU repair 
rates for a 1oo2 SIS system 
The behaviour of the 1oo2 redundant system with regards to the effect of DU failure rate, 𝜆𝐷𝑈, is 
compatible with 1oo1 simple system. Using the principle of IEC 61508 [1] for a low demand 
system, the PFD and the visit frequency of 1oo1 SIS should be equal to the standard low demand 
formulae when the mean duration of the demands is smaller than the test interval. These values 
are approximately [1,24]: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 ≈ 1 2⁄ (𝜏. 𝜆𝐷𝑈)  and 𝐻𝐸𝐹 ≈ 𝑃𝐹𝐷. 𝜆𝐷𝐸 (28) 
According to the Equation (28) any adjustment in DU failure rate will directly result in increase 
or decrease in unavailability of SIS and subsequently in visit frequency. This pattern is consistent 
with the observation made in Figure 14 and Figure 15 as interpreted above which display similar 
pattern of behaviour in 1oo1 and 1oo2 systems. 
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In order to interrogate the effect of DU repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝑈, on SIS performance indicators, we 
consider 𝜆𝐷𝑈 to be a constant. The sensitivity examination was conducted for a diverse range of 
𝜆𝐷𝑈 consisting of 10
-7, 10-6, 10-5, 10-4 and 10-3 consecutively. Increase in repair rate is deemed as 
an improvement in system performance since higher repair rate leads to reduced system 
unavailability and Figure 16 proves this effect. It can be seen that the PFD decreases as DU 
repair rate increases. The PFD improvement is more evident for lower values of DU failure rates 
at 10-7 and 10-6 but limited disparity is witnessed when 𝜆𝐷𝑈 is fluctuating between 10
-5 and 10-3. 
The HEF curves generated in Figure 17 against 𝜇𝐷𝑈 for varying DD failure rates show a similar 
pattern which is an emphasis on this model behaviour. Due to the enhanced repair rate, the 
system is less exposed to hazardous event therefore reduction in HEF can be realised for almost 
all values of DU failure rate in this figure. Although there is no notable change in system visiting 
the hazardous event for DU failure rate equivalent to 10-3 against variation in DU repair rate. 
  
Figure 16 – PFD verses 𝜇𝐷𝑈 with varying DU failure 
rates for a 1oo2 SIS system 
Figure 17 – HEF verses 𝜇𝐷𝑈 with varying DU failure 
rates for a 1oo2 SIS system 
 
Review of Figure 14 – Figure 17 shows the worst SIS performance as the combination of high 
DU failure rate and low DU repair rate which results in substantial unavailability of the high 
integrity pressure and temperature protection system and frequent visits to hazardous state. When 
designing a SIS this combination shall be avoided, otherwise the effectiveness of SIS as an 
independent layer of protection will be compromised. 
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5.5.3 The effect of 𝝀𝑫𝑫 and 𝝁𝑫𝑫 
For completion of the sensitivity analysis the effect of varying the component DD failure rates, 
𝜆𝐷𝐷, and DD repair rates, 𝜇𝐷𝐷 are also studied in this paper. We first examine the effect of 
varying DD failure rate by considering 𝜇𝐷𝐷 as a constant. The analysis were carried out for 𝜇𝐷𝐷 
equal to 1 10⁄ , 
1
8⁄ , 
1
6⁄ , 
1
4⁄  and 
1
2⁄ . The system unavailability is constant for lower values of 
DD failure rate across the range of 𝜇𝐷𝐷 and deteriorates sharply whilst the DD failure rate 
acquires higher values as shown in Figure 18. No considerable change between various values of 
DD repair rate is observed as 𝜆𝐷𝐷 attains higher frequencies. The system visit frequency to 
hazardous event is demonstrated in Figure 19. The concurrent increase in HEF and DD failure 
rate is perceived in this figure although no notable change in HEF across the designated range of 
𝜇𝐷𝐷 is identified. 
  
Figure 18 – PFD verses 𝜆𝐷𝐷 with varying DD repair rates 
for a 1oo2 SIS system 
Figure 19 – HEF verses 𝜆𝐷𝐷 with varying DD repair 
rates for a 1oo2 SIS system 
 
In order to review the impact of varying DD repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝐷, we assume that DD failure rate, 
𝜆𝐷𝐷, is a constant. The assessment was completed for 𝜆𝐷𝐷 values of 10
-7, 10-6, 10-5, 10-4 and 10-3. 
Similar to the 𝜇𝐷𝑈 inclination, increase in DD repair rate will result in enhancement of system 
availability and reduction in PFD as shown in Figure 20, though this reduction is not largely 
distinguished. The PFD curves overlap for 𝜆𝐷𝐷 alternating between 10
-7 – 10-5 which illustrates 
that the system is independent of variation in DD repair rates for lower DD failure frequencies. A 
substantial rapid rise in unavailability is however recognised when 𝜆𝐷𝑈 is equivalent to 10
-3 
where PFD reduces as the DD repair rate rises. This feature is also mirrored in the system 
L
O
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) 
–
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G
 (
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) 
𝜇𝐷𝐷 𝜇𝐷𝐷 
LOG (𝝀𝑫𝑫) LOG (𝝀𝑫𝑫) 
 Page 37 
R
eliab
ility
 A
n
aly
sis o
f S
afety
 In
stru
m
en
ted
 S
y
stem
s S
u
b
ject to
 P
ro
cess D
em
an
d
 
F
irst Y
ear R
ep
o
rt 
entering the hazardous event in Figure 21 where higher HEF is produced by greater values of 
𝜆𝐷𝐷. The HEF shows negligible variation against change in 𝜇𝐷𝐷 for lower values of DD failure 
rate but demonstrates a reduction in the system visit frequency to hazardous state for higher 𝜆𝐷𝐷. 
The behaviour of system PFD and HEF versus DD failure rates, 𝜆𝐷𝐷, and its repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝐷, is 
in line with the overall expectation of SIS performance for 1oo2 redundant configurations. 
  
Figure 20 – PFD verses 𝜇𝐷𝐷 with varying DD failure 
rates for a 1oo2 SIS system 
Figure 21 – HEF verses 𝜇𝐷𝐷 with varying DD failure 
rates for a 1oo2 SIS system 
6.0 Conclusions 
This paper has presented a new unavailability model for a redundant safety instrumented system 
using Markov chains approach. The main objective of this article was to develop a new model for 
a 1oo2 SIS in low demand mode of operation based on an established simple 1oo1 simple 
system. This model incorporates process demand inflicted on the SIS in conjunction with 
established system failure modes such as dangerous detected and undetected failure rates. Two 
measures have been utilised namely the probability of failure on demand and the hazardous event 
frequency to measure the unavailability and safety performance of the model. The present paper 
focusses on comparing architectures, noting that proof test coverage and common cause failures 
are omitted, and leading to optimistic results. This may not be sufficient to satisfy the IEC 
requirements for PFD calculation whilst remaining compliant. Although this assumption limits 
the application of the proposed model, it is considered as a step forward towards the 
unavailability modelling of safety instrumented systems subject to process demand using Markov 
chains. The simultaneous consideration of SIS primary failure modes (dangerous detected and 
L
O
G
 (
P
F
D
) 
–
 L
O
G
 (
H
E
F
) 
𝜆𝐷𝐷 
𝜆𝐷𝐷 
LOG (𝝁𝑫𝑫) LOG (𝝁𝑫𝑫) 
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dangerous undetected) and process demand (demand rate and demand duration) is the main 
advantage of Markov modelling as this is not achievable by traditional reliability tools such as 
RBD and FTA. Hence, the utilisation of Markov model to its full advantage is implemented in 
the proposed model. 
 
The validity of the model introduced in this research was examined in a case study of protection 
system for a pressurised chemical reactor containing volatile hydrocarbon multiphase fluid. A 
comparison of 1oo1 vs 1oo2 configuration for sensor subsystem demonstrates an improvement of 
the system performance due to the introduction of a redundant element within the safety 
instrumented system. This verifies that utilisation of a redundant architecture not only reduces 
unavailability but also improves the safety performance of the system, resulting in lower 
frequency of system visiting hazardous state. The behaviour of the 1oo2 SIS was further 
examined by performing sensitivity analysis against various model parameters including demand 
rate and demand duration as well as component failure rates (DD and DU) and the associated 
repair rates. The results confirm that the model behaviour against variation in parameters is 
consistent with the overall expectation of SIS performance for a redundant 1oo2 configuration. 
 
It is to be noted that the assumption about system restoring from the hazardous state to the “as 
good as new” state, was made to calculate the steady state probabilities. In some cases however, 
this is neither applicable, nor a realistic assumption. The detailed analysis of a multi-component 
system (e.g. 1oo3, 2oo3 etc) will be more complex from a computational point of view, and the 
main features of the analysis may easily dissolve in the computational details, but this has not 
been pursued any further and may be a topic for further work. At the same time, it would be of 
great interest to study the effects of common cause failure in a 1oo2 safety instrumented system 
which is subject to process demand as well as inaccuracy of the proof test where deemed 
practical. These are also new topics for further research. 
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Notations 
𝜏 proof test interval 
𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡) system transition probability from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 transition rate from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗 
𝐴 transition rate matrix 
λ component failure rate 
λ𝐷𝐸 process demand rate 
𝜆𝐷 dangerous failure rate 
𝜆𝐷𝐷 dangerous detected failure rate 
𝜆𝐷𝑈 dangerous undetected failure rate 
𝜇 component repair rate 
𝜇𝐷𝐷 dangerous detected repair rate 
𝜇𝐷𝐸 demand reset rate 
𝜇𝐷𝑈 dangerous undetected repair rate 
𝜇𝑇 renewal rate 
𝜋𝑖 steady state probability of system in state 𝑖 
Π steady state probabilities matrix 
𝐷𝐶 diagnostic coverage rate 
𝑃(𝑡) transition matrix at time 𝑡 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡) probability of system in state 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
?́?𝑖(𝑡) time derivative probability of system in state 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝑟 states of stochastic process 
𝛽𝐷 detected common cause failure factor 
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𝛽𝑈 undetected common cause failure factor 
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